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One of the major goals of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to reduce policy barriers
to international trade. Yet, its dispute settlement system allows members to raise tariﬀs
in response to trade violations committed by other members. Although retaliation is per-
mitted only as a last resort the fact that the WTO even permits tariﬀ escalation appears
to be a direct contradiction of the ideal of freer trade. This contradiction as well as the
fact that many small countries cannot eﬀectively retaliate via tariﬀsh a v el e a dt oc a l l sf o r
alternative trade dispute remedies.1
There are at least two possible reasons why the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU) permits tariﬀ retaliation. First, the threat of retaliation might encourage
members to comply with WTO rules: in the absence of any fear of foreign retaliation,
members would be tempted to raise their trade barriers whenever so urged by their im-
port lobbies since domestic exporters would suﬀer no retaliation and thus would have little
incentive to counter-lobby to keep the local market open. Second, tariﬀ retaliation may
allow an injured country to obtain partial compensation by either improving its terms of
trade (which happens if it is large enough to aﬀect world prices) or by beneﬁting those
import competing sectors that are favored due to political economy considerations. Of
course, even if tariﬀ retaliation helps enforce cooperation and/or enable compensation in
trade agreements, it may not necessarily be the optimal instrument for achieving these ob-
jectives. In principle, monetary ﬁnes payable by a country that violates WTO rules could
have both a deterrent eﬀect and a compensatory one while simultaneously avoiding the
well-known ineﬃciencies of tariﬀs. Our goal in this paper is to evaluate whether the use of
ﬁnes and bonds can improve upon the WTO’s current dispute settlement system based on
retaliatory tariﬀs.
The idea that trade disputes be settled via ﬁnancial compensation has gained substantial
1See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) for a good overview of the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures.
Lawrence (2003) notes that WTO rules are designed to preserve the existing balance of concessions (i.e.
to maintain reciprocity). Ethier (2003) argues that the role of the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure is
“not to facilitate punishment: It is to constrain it.”
1attention in recent years with several new proposals to reform the DSU in the Doha Round,
which is still under way.2 Such proposals have tended to originate in countries that do
not have suﬃcient market power to inﬂuence world prices and are therefore incapable of
either inﬂicting signiﬁcant harm on large countries or achieving compensation through tariﬀ
retaliation. Similar proposals were made in the early 1960s by Uruguay and Brazil who
wanted less developed countries to be provided with ﬁnancial compensation for GATT
violations committed by developed countries. As Dam (1970) notes, such proposals are
attractive for several reasons. First, the principle of ﬁnancial liability to injured parties
underlies domestic laws across the world and its use in international law seems natural.
Second, tariﬀ retaliation is often not in the interest of an injured party. For example,
optimal tariﬀs for countries that are too small to inﬂuence world prices would be typically
near zero. As a result, any tariﬀ retaliation will only further reduce their welfare.3
Desirable as it may seem, the implementation of ﬁnancial compensation faces important
hurdles. We address what we think is the major hurdle: enforcing such a system.H o wd o e s
o n ee n s u r et h a tt h er e q u i r e dﬁne, whatever it is ruled to be, is actually paid by a violating
country? While an injured country can implement retaliatory tariﬀs without requiring any
cooperation from a violating country, such is not the case for ﬁnes. Ultimately, a violating
country has to agree to pay the ﬁne and it will only do so when it is in its best interest
since there exists no supra-national authority that can enforce the payment of the ﬁne.4
2For example, in an article in the Financial Times of 24th June, 2004, Bronckers and Van Den Broek
have argued strongly in favor of ﬁnancial compensation as a means of settling trade disputes. See Bronckers
and Van Den Broek (2005) for an in-depth discussion of the legal and economic arguments in favor of
ﬁnancial compensation.
3One alternative is for such countries to retaliate in other parts of the WTO agreement. In the recent
bananas dispute involving the European Union (EU) and several banana exporters, Ecuador was authorized
to do so and it threatened the EU that it would not respect the intellectual property provisions in the TRIPS
for EU products unless the EU carried out the DSU ruling (WTO document WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, 2000).
Limão (2005) provides a formal analysis of the enforcement eﬀects of this type of linkage of cooperation
across issues with international spillovers in the context of trade agreements. Although this is legally
possible, Ecuador must no longer think this recourse is suﬃciently satisfactory since it is one of the
countries that recently proposed monetary ﬁnes to address trade disputes (WTO document TN/DS/W/9,
2002). A diﬀerent proposal was put forward by Mexico who argued that injured countries be allowed to
trade their retaliation rights, i.e. to “sell” them to countries that have suﬃcient market power to credibly
threaten tariﬀ retaliation. Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2004a) analyze this proposal and formally
show how a properly designed auction for retaliation rights would be eﬃciency improving.
4Another hurdle might be an informational one: determining the ﬁnancial loss incurred by an exporter.
2This enforcement problem with ﬁnancial compensation is clearly reﬂected in the current
DSU — it allows for compensation but does not specify the form it must take. Article 22.2
of the DSU states that the compensation must be mutually agreed upon and if it is not, an
injured country can apply for retaliation. The only case that we know of where a dispute
resulted in monetary compensation was when the US was found guilty of non-payment of
royalties by US ﬁrms to the EU. This shows that while ﬁnancial compensation is possible
under the DSU, it simply has not been agreed to in most trade disputes that have come
before the WTO.5
A ni m p o r t a n to bj e c t i v eo ft h i sp a p e ri st oa n a l y z et h ee ﬀectiveness of alternative dispute
remedies in maintaining relatively low trade barriers. We also analyze the eﬀectiveness of
the diﬀerent systems from the perspective of compensating injured countries. In so doing,
we argue that one needs to account not only for how a remedy is able to enforce cooperation
but also how the remedy itself can be enforced.F o rﬁnes to succeed in enforcing low tariﬀs
and providing compensation, it is crucial that they be backed by a supporting instrument
that is not controlled by a violating country. Retaliatory tariﬀsa r et h eo b v i o u sc h o i c ef o r
such a supporting instrument. However, we show that a system where retaliatory tariﬀs
are used to support the payment of ﬁnes yields no more cooperation than one that uses
tariﬀs alone to retaliate against violations.
The equivalence of ﬁnes and tariﬀ retaliation in terms of enforcement suggests that
both mechanisms yield the same payoﬀs. However, we show that this is only true if there
are no deviations from cooperation in equilibrium. When such deviations occur, and they
clearly do in practice, we show that ﬁnes supported by tariﬀs have an advantage over tariﬀ
retaliation as a primary remedy. Namely, the payoﬀ to an injured country is higher under
ﬁnes even though the cost of the penalty for a violating country is unchanged. Thus we
However, a similar issue occurs under the current tariﬀ retaliation system. For more recent discussions by
legal scholars on improvements of the WTO’s DSU and use of monetary compensation see Shaﬀer (2003)
and Hudec (2002).
5However, recently monetary ﬁnes have been introduced by the US in its preferential trade agreements
with Singapore, Chile, the central American countries, and Australia. More speciﬁcally, in these agree-
ments, monetary ﬁnes are typically a preferred form of compensation when there is a violation related to
the trade or intellectual property right provisions.
3show that switching to ﬁnes generates a Pareto improvement in the presence of shocks that
result in disputes along the equilibrium path. The underlying motive for this result is that
tariﬀsa r ea ni n e ﬃcient form of compensation because the welfare gain they generate for
an injured country (if it has market power) is always less than the welfare cost imposed on
the country that committed the original violation.6
Given that tariﬀ retaliation is usually not a credible threat for small countries, it is
important to know whether such countries can beneﬁt from enforcement mechanisms that
do not rely on tariﬀ retaliation. To this end, we ask whether international cooperation
can be sustained by a system where each country posts a bond of a given amount prior to
trading, with the understanding that its bond will be used to pay a ﬁne in case it commits
a trade violation. We ﬁnd that bonds can only improve enforcement relative to a system
based on retaliatory tariﬀs if they are held by a third party. Otherwise, i.e., if bonds are
simply exchanged by two countries, a deviating country would have no incentive to return
the other country’s bond and ultimately the threat of tariﬀ retaliation would once again be
required. By contrast, if bonds are deposited in an escrow fund (i.e. with a third party),
tariﬀ retaliation is no longer necessary since the bond posted by the violating country can
be used to compensate the injured country. Such an escrow scheme was in fact proposed
by Chile in its bilateral trade agreement with the US.7
Finally, we show that bonds can help solve a collective action problem by small coun-
tries and enable them to obtain tariﬀ concessions from large countries. This point needs
elaboration. One problem facing small countries in reciprocal trade negotiations is that
their individually optimal tariﬀs are low (even though they may be able to jointly exert
enough market power to hurt large countries). Therefore, if a large country violates its com-
6In a diﬀerent context, Hoekman and Saggi (2006) argue that since most developing countries lack
the institutional capacity for ﬁghting foreign export cartels via antitrust enforcement, developed countries
ought to ban such cartels in return for tariﬀ concessions or some monetary compensation. Cartelization
creates an ineﬃciency much like the use of a tariﬀ by a large country in that the loss suﬀered by the injured
party exceeds the gain of the other party. They show that if tariﬀ retaliation is a credible option for an
importing low income country, the transfer it has to pay to its high income trade partner in order to secure
a ban on export cartels is lower.
7“Chile Looks for Monetary Sanctions as Enforcement Mechanism”, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 13,
11/11/2002.
4mitments and increases its tariﬀ on a product exported by several small countries, none of
them has an individual incentive to punish the large country via tariﬀ retaliation. In fact,
each small country prefers that some other country undertake the retaliation. Anticipating
this free riding, a large country has no motive to oﬀer tariﬀ reductions in products primarily
exported by small countries. Bonds solve the free riding problem since small countries no
longer need to retaliate via tariﬀs. This allows small countries to credibly coordinate their
threats against a large country and thus obtain tariﬀ concessions from it.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and derive
the Nash and cooperative tariﬀs in the absence of enforcement problems. In section 3 we
introduce the alternative enforcement mechanisms and contrast their outcomes in terms of
the liberalization they can enforce. In section 4 we discuss the implications of bonds for
small countries. We also show the ex-post eﬃciency of ﬁnes relative to tariﬀ retaliation as a
form of compensation when trade disputes occur in equilibrium. In section 5 we summarize
the results and discuss possible extensions.
2M o d e l
Given that the issue of alternative enforcement mechanisms is not yet well understood we
start with the simpler case of two symmetric countries (home and foreign). In section 4
we consider the case where countries are asymmetric in size. Each country produces two
homogeneous goods, i = x,y,w h e r ex denotes home’s import. Under trade, domestic
import prices are given by p = pw + τ where pw i st h e“ w o r l d ”p r i c ea n dτ is a speciﬁc
import tariﬀ. Home’s excess demand is then Mi ≡ Di(pi) − Si(pi) where Di measures
demand for good i and Si its supply. Denoting foreign variables with an asterisk (*), the
world price pw is determined by the usual market clearing condition and is therefore a
function of the policy variables. For the home country’s import good, the market clearing








5A similar condition applies to foreign’s import good, y. We assume that no export policies
are used so that trade policy is simply described by the level of the import tariﬀ in each
country, τ and τ∗. Moreover, we assume that countries have market power in trade so that
their optimal tariﬀs are positive. It is then simple to verify that, in this setup, tariﬀsl o w e r
world prices, pw
i , and raise the domestic ones.
We focus directly on a reduced form objective function for the government that may
allow extra weight (measured by λi ≥ 1)t ob ep l a c e do np r o d u c e rs u r p l u sr e l a t i v et o







Si(pi)dpi + τiMi (2)
When the government’s objective in choosing trade policy is to simply maximize W ≡
ΣiWi this represents the reduced form of a political contributions model such as Grossman-
Helpman (1994).8
The Nash tariﬀ is obtained by maximizing (2) while taking the other country’s tariﬀ as














The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h ee q u a t i o na b o v e ,1/ε, is the inverse of the foreign
export supply elasticity and it reﬂects the terms-of-trade motive for the use of tariﬀs. The
second term reﬂects a political economy motive that is increasing in the extra weight placed
on producers (λ) and decreasing in home’s import demand elasticity (ξ).9 Given symmetry,
8In Grossman-Helpman (1994) the government’s objective is WGH = a ¯ W +c,w h e r e ¯ W is social welfare,
c is political contributions and a is the marginal rate of substitution between the two. In Wi the term λ−1
can be directly interpreted as the inverse of a when factor ownership is extremely concentrated.
9See the appendix for the derivation and exact deﬁnitions.
6the foreign country’s import tariﬀ is also the same, i.e. τN
x = τN∗
y .
At the other extreme, if cooperation was not subject to any enforcement problems,
countries would choose tariﬀs that maximize their joint objective W+W∗.T h i si se q u i v a l e n t
to maximizing the objective of either one once we employ symmetry and note that τ = τ∗.
Thus we obtain
τ





which implies that the globally optimal ad-valorem tariﬀ τg/pw is given by
τg




It is simple to see that the globally optimal cooperative tariﬀ is lower than the non-
cooperative tariﬀ (i.e. τg/pw <τ N/pw). The diﬀerence between the Nash and globally
cooperative policies conﬁrms that market power in trade leads to international externalities
that can potentially be resolved by trade agreements (as argued in Bagwell and Staiger
[1999]). Moreover, it points out that even in the presence of an international agreement,
countries may choose to have positive tariﬀs due to internal political economy distortions.
Since the globally optimum tariﬀ is below the level that is optimal for each individual
country, each country has an incentive to deviate from it and would do so if it faced no
punishment. We now address how countries can enforce cooperation.
3 Enforcement of trade agreements
The absence of a supra-national authority to punish violators implies that international
agreements must be self-enforcing. Cooperative self-enforcing agreements are well charac-
terized by certain repeated games.10 We begin with the standard approach in the literature
of using the threat of tariﬀ retaliation to enforce cooperation and then contrast its outcome
with alternative enforcement mechanisms.
10See Dixit (1987) and Bagwell and Staiger (1990) for example.
73.1 Supporting cooperation via tariﬀ retaliation
Consider an indeﬁnitely repeated game where the stage game delivers the Nash tariﬀ de-
scribed in the previous section. Assume that governments observe each other’s actions at
the end of each period. The strategy employed by countries is to start by cooperating until
one deviates by raising its tariﬀ. Any deviation is followed by a punishment phase of n peri-
ods after which cooperation is resumed. The motive for modelling temporary punishments
is that they are clearly more realistic than inﬁnite Nash reversion. Although the latter is
a possibility, we view it as the ultimate punishment corresponding to an unravelling of the
GATT/WTO system that results from member countries not following its rules. The more
common occurrence are trade disputes that are met with temporary punishments, which is
more similar to what we now model.11
To ﬁnd the lowest cooperative tariﬀ that is renegotiation proof we must ﬁrst deﬁne the
payoﬀs to each government under the alternative situations that can arise. In the absence







Similarly, when countries cooperate, i.e. set their tariﬀsa tτc (that is determined below),






If a country deviates, it does so by imposing its optimal Nash tariﬀ τN on its trading
partner who, in that period, still utilizes the cooperative tariﬀ, τc.T h ep a y o ﬀ t oac o u n t r y






11Here we focus on a case where there are no deviations occur in equilibrium. In section 4 we examine
the compensation aspect of diﬀerent remedies when shocks cause a deviation to occur.
8Since we allow for renegotiation after a deviation we must model the punishment phase
before cooperation is resumed. We assume that countries agree that a deviation will be
followed by n periods of punishment where the country that deviated faces τ∗ = τN and
must show its willingness to restart cooperation by setting its own tariﬀ at the cooperative
level τc <τ N. The per-period payoﬀ for the deviating country during the punishment














That is, the sum of the payoﬀ of a deviation, WD, and the continuation payoﬀ, V τ, should
not exceed the discounted payoﬀ of cooperation. We deﬁne δ = δρ < 1 where ¯ δ reﬂects a
proper discount factor, ρ i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h eg a m ec o n t i n u e sf o ro n em o r ep e r i o d ,











Since WP <W N the punishment phase is subgame perfect only if it is not proﬁtable
for the country that is being punished to simply abandon the agreement and revert to Nash








Because WC >W P the longer the punishment phase, the lower is V τ.T h e r e f o r e t h e
maximum punishment that is WRP is found by increasing n to lower the continuation
12Farrell and Maskin (1989) and Van Damme (1989) show that using the following punishment as part
of the strategy is WRP: the party that deviates accepts to be punished and during that period it plays
cooperatively. In this case clearly WP <W N. The WRP concept requires the strategy not to be Pareto
dominated (i.e. W∗P >W ∗C) so that cooperation does not Pareto dominate the punishment phase for the
i n j u r e dp a r t y .W h e nt h i si st h ec a s e ,t h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r yi sb e t t e ro ﬀ when home is punished than under
cooperation but home is worse oﬀ.
9payoﬀ until it is equal to the RHS of (12). We deﬁne this value as nmax, which is implicitly
given by
V















To conﬁrm that the lowest cooperative tariﬀ that is WRP is identical to the one under











The lowest self-enforcing tariﬀ under inﬁnite Nash reversion or WRP is implicitly deﬁned
when (14) holds with equality. This serves as a convenient benchmark against which alter-
native enforcement mechanisms can be compared. Since we are interested in enforcement
problems we assume that the global optimum tariﬀ is not self-enforcing under tariﬀ retali-
ation, i.e. that δ in (14) is too low to sustain τg.
3.2 Fines and tariﬀ retaliation
We now consider the eﬀect of switching from tariﬀ retaliation to a monetary ﬁne to punish
deviations from a trade agreement. One key diﬀerence between these options is that the ﬁne
must be voluntarily paid by the deviating country whereas retaliatory tariﬀsa r ei m p o s e d
by the other country. This means that if the country that deviates decides not to pay the
ﬁne, the only thing the other country can ultimately do is to revert to non-cooperation in
tariﬀs, which in our model is equivalent to leaving the agreement altogether. Given this,
t h em o s tc o o p e r a t i v et a r i ﬀ t h a tc a nb ea c h i e v e df o rag i v e nﬁne of value f is determined
as follows.
First, after a deviation, a country must face a punishment payoﬀequal to the cooperative
payoﬀ net of the monetary ﬁne: WP = WC − f. We assume that this ﬁne is paid in the
form of a numeraire good that is valued according to a quasilinear utility function.13 It is
13We can model this explicitly by assuming, for example, that each period countries get an endowment
of some value β>fthat can be consumed or partially used for the ﬁne. Alternatively, the numeraire can
be produced using labor only in a constant returns production process. Since in either case the surplus
10reasonable to suppose that if the ﬁne is paid, the transfer occurs in a single period. Thus
we set n =1without loss of generality since we can always alter the value of the ﬁne, f,
to mimic the eﬀects of changes in n. The incentive constraint is then similar to the one we







The continuation payoﬀ V f is now the cost of the ﬁne, −δf, plus the stream of cooperative
payoﬀs
V





If we ignore the renegotiation proofness constraint, there exists a suﬃciently large f that
delivers the global optimum, τg. However, we must ensure that the punishment payoﬀ is
WRP. Also, since in the absence of tariﬀ retaliation a deviating country has no incentive
to pay the ﬁne, there ultimately must be a punishment for not doing so. In the context of
our model, the only punishment that the other country can impose is to increase its tariﬀ.
Therefore the WRP constraint is deﬁned with respect to the payoﬀ under inﬁnite Nash
reversion and it requires that
V
f ≥ W
Nδ/(1 − δ) (17)
Thus WRP requires the maximum ﬁne, fmax, and resulting minimum payoﬀ that the de-
viating country can be held to, V f min,t ob e
V










which implies that the maximum ﬁne that is WRP is the present discounted value of
from the numeraire good before ﬁnes is identical under cooperation and/or deviation, we need not include
it explicitly in the payoﬀ expressions since such inclusion does not alter the incentive constraints (and thus
tariﬀs).




N)/(1 − δ) (19)
By substituting V f = V f min in (15) we can obtain the lowest cooperative tariﬀ that











This constraint is identical to the one under tariﬀ r e t a l i a t i o ni n( 1 4 ) . W es u m m a r i z e
this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Enforcement equivalence of tariﬀsa n dﬁnes):
In a trade agreement between two symmetric countries, the most cooperative tariﬀ that can
be enforced by tariﬀ retaliation is equal to the tariﬀ that can be enforced with WRP ﬁnes.
The basic intuition behind this result becomes clear after we note two points. First,
since the ﬁne must be paid by the violating country it must ﬁnd it in its best interest to do
so. Therefore, the ﬁne itself needs to be enforced. In the absence of additional instruments
this enforcement must rely on the threat of inﬁnite tariﬀ retaliation, i.e. the breakdown of
the trade agreement. Second, the maximum punishment that is WRP is the payoﬀ that
the deviating country would get if it abandoned the agreement. This is true of the value of
the ﬁne paid and the cost imposed by temporary tariﬀ retaliation. Thus both alternatives
yield the same cooperative tariﬀ.
There is one important corollary of proposition 1. Since the most cooperative tariﬀ is
identical under these two mechanisms, the payoﬀs are also exactly the same. This is because
thus far we have not introduced any deviations in equilibrium and, along the equilibrium
path, countries always obtain the cooperative payoﬀ WC (that depends only on the level
of the cooperative tariﬀ). In section 4.2 we show that if deviations do occur along the
equilibrium path, the payoﬀs under the two mechanisms are diﬀerent. Before doing so, we
12analyze whether an alternative enforcement mechanism can improve cooperation relative
to the ones analyzed above.
3.3 Exchanging bonds
Suppose that at the beginning of every period each country posts a bond of value b (mea-
s u r e di na nu n t a x e dn u m e r a i r eg ood )t h a ti su s e dt op a yaﬁne in case it commits a violation.
Assume also that countries observe this and cooperate only if such a bond is posted by
both of them. Naturally, once bonds are posted, countries are free to decide whether to
cooperate on tariﬀs or not. If either country does not post a bond, both play Nash in tariﬀs
forever (we later discuss the case where the punishment phase is ﬁnite).
As a baseline, suppose that there is no third party that holds the bonds so that govern-
ments must post them with each other (either a third party is not available or using it is
too expensive due to transaction costs and/or non-veriﬁability). If at the end of a period
both countries have cooperated then they “return” their bonds to each other, otherwise
the country that deviated loses its bond.
Under inﬁnite Nash reversion, if a country deviates in tariﬀs it will be optimal for it not
to return the other country’s bond. In this case, the equilibrium tariﬀ remains unchanged











where the payoﬀ under Nash reversion is the same as before since under no cooperation both
countries simply set their tariﬀsa tτN and bonds are irrelevant. The functional form of the
cooperation payoﬀ is also unchanged because we assume that if countries cooperate they
receive their bond and consume it at the end of the period (and we assume no discounting
within the period). The key diﬀerence is the deviation payoﬀ, which is now given by the
original value, WD, net of the value of the bond that is lost, −b and the one not returned,
b∗. However, if, as we expect due to symmetry and stationarity, the optimal bond is the
same for both countries (i.e. b∗ = b), the constraint in (21) is identical to the one in (14)
13and thus the resulting cooperative tariﬀ is equal to that under inﬁnite Nash reversion.
Now consider the case where the punishment phase is ﬁnite. Countries start cooperating
by initially posting a bond b with each other. If a country deviates from the cooperative
tariﬀ, it loses its bond. For cooperation to be resumed, the deviating country must return
the present discounted value of the bond of the injured country, b∗/δ.I f i t d o e s s o i n
the period after which the deviation occurs, tariﬀs return to the cooperative level. The
incentive constraint for cooperation can be written as:
W
D + b

























Replacing this in (22) we obtain an IC for the lowest cooperative tariﬀ under bonds
that is exactly the same as in (21), which we already noted yields the same tariﬀ as inﬁnite
Nash reversion.
3.4 Bonds with third party enforcement
If a third party holds the bonds, a country that cooperates always receives its bond at the
e n do ft h ep e r i o d( i na d d i t i o nt or e c e i v i n gt h eb o n do ft h ed e v i a t i n gc o u n t r y ) .T h e r e f o r e
the gain from deviation is now WD − b. Moreover, since the country that deviates has no
control over the bond of the other country, cooperation can be resumed in the following
14period. Therefore the IC is now
W








where, since the full punishment of deviation is incurred in the deviation period, the con-
tinuation payoﬀ is simply δ
1−δWC. This implies that the WRP constraint is always satisﬁed







is feasible. This bond enforces the same cooperative tariﬀs as bonds without a third party
(as well as Nash reversion etc.). However, a larger bond can also be used since the WRP
constraint does not bind and such a bond can enforce a lower tariﬀ. Therefore the use of
bonds held by third parties can improve on the level of cooperation achieved by the other
enforcement mechanisms and it requires no threat of tariﬀs.
Consider now the case when ﬁnes are used for temporary punishment and a bond is
posted but forfeited only if a ﬁne is not paid. After a tariﬀ deviation, the bond is held and







The maximum ﬁne and associated minimum V τb that ensures the punishment is WRP,
requires the following. The payoﬀ from paying the ﬁne and receiving the bond held at the
time of deviation and continuing tariﬀ c o o p e r a t i o nm u s tb ea tl e a s ta sl a r g ea st h ep a y o ﬀ
from not paying the ﬁne, forfeiting the bond and continuing tariﬀ cooperation. Thus
V










Therefore the maximum ﬁne that is WRP is fmax = b/δ. Substituting in (26) we obtain
W








15This condition is exactly the same as the one we obtained in the absence of ﬁnes, i.e.
(24). Again, we could choose the bond value b = δ
1−δ(WC − WN) (or higher) to obtain a
cooperative tariﬀ that is at least as low as that can be supported by ﬁnes under inﬁnite
tariﬀ reversion. The key diﬀerence relative to the case of no bonds is that now the same
cooperative tariﬀ (or lower) can be obtained without ever requiring tariﬀ retaliation or its
threat.14
We summarize the results on the enforcement properties of bonds versus tariﬀsi nt h e
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Enforcement under tariﬀsv e r s u sb o n d s ) :
In a trade agreement between two symmetric countries, the most cooperative tariﬀ that can
be enforced by tariﬀ retaliation is
(a) equal to the tariﬀ enforced by WRP bonds exchanged between them and
(b) higher than the tariﬀ enforced by WRP bonds posted with a third party.
This proposition reinforces the point that ﬁnancial compensation can only improve on
tariﬀ retaliation if the compensation itself is enforced by something other than tariﬀs. The
alternative presented in this proposition is to post the bonds with a third party that has
the ability to ensure that compensation is paid by the party that commits a violation.15
14In terms of enforcement levels, there is no obvious advantage in this simple model to using ﬁnes
supported by bonds as opposed to simply using bonds in this model since the lowest cooperative tariﬀ is
identical under the two alternatives.
15If bonds cannot be used to support ﬁnes, perhaps ﬁnes could be auctioned by smaller countries to
t h o s et h a th a v es u ﬃcient market power to credibly threaten tariﬀ retaliation. Bagwell, Mavroidis and
Staiger (2004a) show that if a violating country can also bid for the right to retaliate (in order to retire
it), then it ends up winning the auction and the ﬁnal result is eﬀectively a cash payment to the injured
party that does not have the capacity to retaliate. Furthermore, they show that an auction in which the
violating party also participates is in general superior to one in which it does not. Their results imply
that if the right to retaliate could be auctioned, compliance with WTO rules is likely to improve since
even small countries could then eﬀectively threaten retaliation. It is easy to see that their argument is
even stronger in our context: by its very nature, the right to collect a ﬁne ought to be more tradable (and
hence more valuable to third parties) than the right to retaliate via tariﬀs. After all trading retaliatory
measures requires the participation of at least one country large enough to credibly threaten retaliation.
This is clearly not necessary for ﬁnes backed by bonds.
164E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 Asymmetries in country size
We now discuss some of the implications of our analysis for the case where countries are
asymmetric in size. This is important because small countries may lack the ability to
use tariﬀ retaliation and apparently stand the most to gain from a switch to ﬁnes. In fact,
Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2004b) note that there has been no trade dispute in which
ad e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r y( d e ﬁned as a non-OECD member) has imposed retaliatory measures
to induce compliance when faced with a trade violation.16
The ﬁrst problem in modelling asymmetry is that if a country is truly small from a trade
perspective then, under the current trading system, it will not obtain multilateral tariﬀ
reductions in products that it alone exports. This is simply due to the reciprocal nature
of tariﬀ concessions. If a small country’s tariﬀ reduction does not aﬀect the price received
by an exporter then the exporter has no incentive to oﬀer a reciprocal tariﬀ concession to
the small country.17 Therefore we consider a case where each country trading with a large
country is small individually but large collectively. We then ask if there is a problem in
the current enforcement system that may be ameliorated with an alternative mechanism.
Suppose that there is a set of small countries, that are jointly large in importing a
particular good, and that they all export a common good (that no other set of countries
e x p o r t )t oas i n g l el a r g ec o u n t r y .I ft h es m a l lc o u n t r i e sc a nthreaten joint retaliation they
can achieve tariﬀ concessions from the large country. However, such a threat may not be
credible because no small country has an individual incentive to punish a deviation by the
large country (since the terms-of-trade gain for an individual small country from raising
its tariﬀ is close to zero). We can think of the optimal joint punishment for compliance
purposes as a public good subject to a free rider problem. Therefore, ex-ante the small
countries may fail to extract signiﬁcant tariﬀ concessions from the large country. We now
16Further empirical evidence on this issue is available in Bown (2004a and 2004b).
17One alternative is that small countries “oﬀer” non-trade related concessions, as was done with TRIPS
in the Uruguay Round. However, here we want to focus strictly on the exchange of trade concessions.
17show this free rider problem continues to exist even if ﬁnes (supported by tariﬀs) are used
to enforce cooperation but that it can be overcome by the use of bonds.
To focus the analysis on the coordination problem, the only change we make in the setup
is to assume that the foreign country is now a collection of κ independent and identical
small countries. Each small country’s demand and supply functions equal D∗
i/κ and S∗
i /κ
respectively and its payoﬀ in sector i is simply W∗
i /κ where κ is a positive integer. It should
be immediately obvious from the welfare expression in (2) that if the small countries could
coordinate their eﬀorts and maximize their joint objective, our analysis of cooperation
between two symmetric countries enforced via the threat of tariﬀ retaliation would remain
r e l e v a n ts i n c et h ej o i n to b j e c t i v eo ft h es m a l lc o u n t r i e sΣi,κW∗κ
i =( ΣiκW ∗
i )/κ equals W
under symmetry. Thus, their jointly optimal Nash tariﬀ would still be τN.
However, a problem arises if there is no instrument via which small countries can suc-
cessfully coordinate their choices. In this case if individual small countries consider pun-











w h e r ea l lt h ev a r i a b l e sa r ed e ﬁned similarly to τN in (4). The key diﬀerence is that the
terms-of-trade eﬀect is now reduced to a fraction 1/κ o fi t sp r e v i o u sv a l u e . T h u sa tt h e
original prices implied by (4), the Nash tariﬀ for the large country is unchanged but for
t h es m a l lc o u n t r i e si ti sl o w e rt h a nb e f o r e . 18
From (29) we can see that if the number of small countries κ is suﬃciently high and
λ =1 ,t h eN a s ht a r i ﬀ of each is zero. Under such circumstances, there is nothing a small
country can individually oﬀer to or credibly threaten the large country with. Thus, in the
case of the standard enforcement mechanism that uses only tariﬀs, explored in section 3.1,
the only self-enforcing tariﬀ for the large country is to set its cooperative tariﬀ at the Nash,
τN. So relative to the case where small countries act jointly, they are now clearly worse
oﬀ–they face τN >τ cτ on their exports and impose τ∗Nκ <τ ∗N on their imports–and
18The variables in (29) refer to foreign’s import sector, y. At the original prices we have z∗
y = zx for all
the variables z = S,M,ε,ξ because of symmetry.
18the large country is better oﬀ.T h eu s eo fﬁnes backed by tariﬀ retaliation, as we explored
in section 3.2, fails to improve upon this outcome for the small countries because, as we
showed before, the maximum WRP ﬁne is tied to the payoﬀ under inﬁnite Nash reversion
in tariﬀs, which is τ∗Nκ in the absence of coordination.
The general solution under tariﬀ retaliation with λ ≥ 1 and a ﬁnite number of small
countries entails an asymmetric solution where the large country sets a cooperative tariﬀ
that is higher than the one it faces from the small countries (see the proof of Proposition
3 in the appendix). The basic motive is simply the inability of the latter to retaliate
jointly. However, if bonds were posted with a third party then the global optimum (i.e.
the symmetric tariﬀ in (6)) can be reached. What is perhaps more interesting is that the
inability of small countries to act jointly in setting tariﬀs becomes an advantage when bonds
are used. To see why this is so, and more generally how bonds improve on cooperation
even if each small country acts alone, we derive the bond that is required by each country
to achieve the global optimum.
For the large country the payoﬀs under cooperation and deviation are still deﬁned by
(8) and (9) respectively but now the foreign cooperative tariﬀs are not necessarily the same
a si t so w n .W ea s s u m et h a ti fi td e v i a t e sa g a i n s ta n yo ft h es m a l lc o u n t r i e st h e ni td e v i a t e s
against all, which may be justiﬁed by the fact that all of them are identical. Thus we
r e q u i r et h ev a l u eo ft h eb o n dt ob es u c ht h a tt h eI Ci n( 2 4 )i ss a t i s ﬁed with equality when









The required bond is simply the terms-of-trade gain for the large country from deviating
against the small countries when all tariﬀsa r ea tt h eg l o b a lo p t i m u m . 19
19If this country deviated then it would forfeit the bond, which would be divided according to the market
share of exporters, in this case each would receive bκ/κ. Since we do not model equilibrium deviations in
this section this division does not aﬀect the results.






















Thus the total value of the bonds posted by the κ identical small countries is W∗D(τ∗Nκ,τg)−
W∗C(τg), which is lower than the bond posted by large. The reason is simple. The value
of each bond is equal to the gain from individual deviation. This is lower for the small
countries because their deviation entails a tariﬀ τ∗Nκ <τ N. Thus bonds not only solve the
coordination problem but they turn the small country disadvantage into an advantage: the
need to post a relatively lower bond. This would be valuable if we modelled an opportunity
cost of posting bonds and/or motives for equilibrium deviations.20
We summarize the discussion above in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Enforcement under tariﬀs versus bonds with asymmetric countries):
In a trade agreement between a large country and a group of κ uncoordinated small coun-
tries, the most cooperative tariﬀ s e tb yt h el a r g ec o u n t r y ,τcκ,i s
(a) higher than the global optimum,τg,a n dt h et a r i ﬀ s e tb ye a c ho ft h es m a l lc o u n t r i e s ,τ∗cκ
if the agreement is enforced only by tariﬀs
(b) equal to τ∗cκ and both are equal to τg if the agreement is enforced by bonds held by a
third party.
Moreover, the bond posted by the large country, bκ, exceeds the total value of the bonds
posted by the small countries, κb∗κ.
20The gains from trade are maximized when the global optimum is implemented. But one may wonder
why in the complete absence of coordination between small countries the large country would not try to
use its bargaining power. By solving the enforcement problem, the existence of bonds may also allow the
small countries to coordinate at the time of the negotiation, making the symmetric solution plausible. If
such coordination fails to occur then the outcome predicted by the model is still the global optimum as
long as transfers were available. But the distribution of surplus between the large and small countries
w o u l dt h e nd e p e n do nt h es p e c i ﬁcs of the bargaining model.
204.2 Compensation under alternative mechanisms
As we note in the Introduction, WTO dispute settlement remedies have both an enforce-
ment and a compensation role. Thus far we have focused only on the enforcement aspect
and shown that enforcement cannot generally be improved by replacing the current system
with ﬁnes (or bonds unless these are held by a third party). Since the most cooperative
tariﬀ under those alternative mechanisms is identical so is the payoﬀ to governments. The
reason is that our model assumes perfect foresight and no shocks, so that no violations
occur in equilibrium. Clearly the assumption of no shocks is not realistic and consequently
neither is the result that no deviations occur along the equilibrium path. We observe plenty
of WTO disputes and violations are found to have occurred in many of the cases. This
is important because once we allow for deviations to occur in equilibrium, the payoﬀst o
countries depend not only on the cooperative tariﬀ but also on the exact mechanism used
to deal with violations. We now show that ﬁnes can generate higher compensation for the
injured country at the same cost to the violator even if the cooperative tariﬀ enforced is
identical.
We illustrate our point in the simplest possible way. We assume governments base
their policies on the set of parameters currently observed and expect them to hold in the
future. We then consider the impact of an unexpected shock, e.g. a shock to the political
economy parameter λ i n( 2 )s ot h a ti nag i v e np e r i o dac o u n t r yd e s i r e sah i g h e rt a r i ﬀ than
the cooperative level previously set. In the following period λ returns to the original level.
Such a shock and the resulting tariﬀ increase would likely trigger a dispute and a ruling
against the country because tariﬀs are bound in the WTO and are not on a contingent set
of parameters (probably because it is diﬃcult to write an agreement that is conditional on
parameters that may be hard to observe by other countries).21
The question we ask is the following: Given that a country deviates from the agreement
due to an unexpected shock, under which mechanisms are the continuation payoﬀsh i g h e r ?
21An alternative way to model this is to assume that the governments anticipate that shocks will occur
and have a well deﬁned distribution of all possible shocks. Bagwell and Staiger (2005) analyze this issue
when governments have private information about future political shocks. One of their ﬁndings is that a
transfer can help in the implementation of eﬃcient tariﬀs.
21We focus on ﬁnes supported by either tariﬀs or bonds not held by third parties so that
either yields the same enforcement outcome as temporary tariﬀ retaliation. Since we focus
on the most cooperative tariﬀ,t h em i n i m u mp a y o ﬀ that the deviating country can be held
to under either alternative is the discounted Nash payoﬀ, WNδ/(1−δ). The question then
is which alternative yields a higher compensation for the injured country. The continuation
payoﬀ for the injured country under temporary tariﬀ retaliation when the most cooperative
WRP is implemented is
V
∗τ ≡ δW









where we recall that the payoﬀ for the injured country under the punishment phase W∗P
exceeds W∗C because the punishment involves the injured setting its optimal tariﬀ τ∗ = τN
and the other country setting its cooperative tariﬀ, τc.








This payoﬀ reﬂects the received ﬁne and the immediate resumption of cooperation with
ap a y o ﬀ W∗C per period, identical to the one in (33) since we derived that both sustain
t h es a m ec o o p e r a t i v et a r i ﬀ. Therefore the compensation under ﬁnes is higher than under
tariﬀ retaliation if and only if the expression in (34) exceeds (33). This yields the following









With this condition we are ready to compare the compensation properties of each mecha-
nism and rank them. Since we consider unanticipated shocks we think that a reasonable
ranking of the two can be established by comparing their payoﬀs under cooperation and
their continuation payoﬀsi fas h o c kd o e so c c u r .T h u sw eu s et h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnition. A
trade agreement enforced by ﬁnes generates a Pareto improvement relative to one using tar-
iﬀs if the following inequalities hold: (i) WC(τcf) ≥ WC(τcτ);( i i )W∗C(τcf) ≥ W∗C(τcτ);
22(iii) V f ≥ V τ;a n d( i v )V ∗f ≥ V ∗τ with at least one holding strictly.W ec a nn o ws t a t et h e
following.
Proposition 4 (Compensation properties and ranking of tariﬀsv e r s u sﬁnes):
In the presence of unanticipated shocks, e.g. to λ, a trade agreement between two symmetric
countries that is enforced by WRP ﬁnes supported by tariﬀs
(a) yields higher compensation for the injured country (V ∗f >V∗τ) and
(b) generate a Pareto improvement
relative to a similar agreement enforced by tariﬀ retaliation alone.
The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o p o s i t i o ns a y st h a tt h ec o n t i n u a t i o np a y o ﬀ for the injured country
a f t e ras h o c ki sh i g h e ru n d e rﬁnes, i.e. the inequality in (35) always holds. We show this
in the appendix, below we will provide the intuition. The second part is a corollary of
part (a) and of proposition 1. In proposition 1 we show that ﬁnes and tariﬀs enforce the
same cooperative tariﬀ so WC(τcf)=WC(τcτ) and similarly for foreign due to symmetry.
Moreover, we also showed that the WRP continuation payoﬀ that a country is held to in
equilibrium is the same under the two alternatives, V f = V τ.S oﬁn e sg e n e r a t eaP a r e t o
improvement.
To see why inequality (35) always holds, note that when the IC under ﬁnes binds then
fmax is given by (19), which due to symmetry is also equal (W∗C − W∗N)/(1 − δ).U s i n g
















The value of the ﬁne received by the injured country (i.e. the left hand side) is equal to
the present discounted value of cooperation in the trade agreement relative to inﬁnite Nash
reversion. This value needs to exceed any temporary gains that the injured country can
obtain by raising its tariﬀ during the punishment phase of nmax periods. The latter gain
is simply the terms-of-trade beneﬁtt h a ti to b t a i n sf r o mu s i n gi t sN a s ht a r i ﬀ relative to
the cooperative one. By using the deﬁnition for nmax in (13) and simplifying we can show
23this condition always holds. The underlying reason is that tariﬀs can transfer income by
changing terms-of-trade but relative to a ﬁne they do so ineﬃciently because tariﬀsc a u s e
a deadweight loss in the process.
5C o n c l u s i o n
There is a widespread opinion that the WTO’s dispute settlement system needs improve-
ment. In particular, there is much concern about the use of tariﬀ retaliation as the sole
mechanism for dealing with member countries that fail to comply with a WTO ruling
against them. In this paper, we analyze alternative mechanisms based on ﬁnancial com-
pensation and argue that one of their major problems is enforcement.
Ultimately, the enforcement of monetary ﬁn e sm a yr e q u i r et h eu s eo fs o m et y p eo f
retaliatory instrument and if such is the case, ﬁnes fail to yield anymore cooperation than
tariﬀs. We also analyze whether bonds (posted prior to trading and revoked in case of a
violation) can substitute for tariﬀs. Here, the key issue is whether they can be posted with
a third party or not. If access to a third party is missing, bonds also fail to improve upon
tariﬀs. Thus, despite their problems, a desirable aspect of retaliatory tariﬀs is that they
are controlled by injured parties and can be used in the event a violating country fails to
comply with the ruling of a WTO panel.
The major problem with tariﬀ retaliation as a means of settling disputes is that tariﬀs
can only be used by countries that have suﬃcient market power in world markets. As a
result, the WTO’s current dispute settlement system does not provide its smaller and/or
developing country members with any real ability to retaliate against violations by other
countries. As Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2004a) have shown, making the right to
retaliate tradable via an auction can help remedy this defect. A similar argument applies
to the use of ﬁnes. If ﬁnes are indeed adopted, they would need to be tradable for small
countries to beneﬁt from their introduction. This would either require the posting of bonds
with third parties or the existence of large countries willing to bid for the right to collect
a ﬁne.
24We also showed that ﬁnes have an advantage over tariﬀ retaliation as a primary remedy:
if a violation does occur, the payoﬀ to an injured country is higher under ﬁnes even though
the cost of the penalty for a violating country is unchanged. The intuition is simple: tariﬀs
are an ineﬃcient form of compensation because the welfare gain they generate for an injured
c o u n t r y( i fi th a sm a r k e tp o w e r )i sa l w a y sl e s st h a nt h ew e l f a r ec o s to nt h ec o u n t r yf a c i n g
the tariﬀ punishment. This establishes the ex-post eﬃciency of ﬁnes.
Future research should build on these insights to determine whether the WTO’s dis-
pute system should move to ﬁnancial compensation as the primary remedy. We see two
important aspects to be modelled, both of which related to the ex-ante eﬃciency of tariﬀs
as an enforcement mechanism. The ﬁr s ti st oa l l o wi n j u r e dc o u n t r i e st os e l e c tt h eg o o d so n
which they retaliate, as observed in recent cases where retaliating parties selected products
produced in swing states. By targeting states with greater political inﬂuence, tariﬀsm a y
be more eﬀective in generating pressure through exporters for the violating government
to comply with the WTO’s ruling. As Lawrence (2003) notes, parties often retaliate in a
fashion that maximizes incentives for compliance. This advantage of tariﬀsr e l a t i v et oﬁnes
can be reinforced when ﬁnes are raised via general taxation. In this case the punishment
for violating the trade agreement, the ﬁne, is dispersed and can go unnoticed. Therefore
future research should extend our analysis to incorporate this ex-ante eﬃciency of tariﬀs
relative to ﬁnes and provide a more deﬁnite ranking of the two.
256 Appendix
6.1 Analytical expressions
The Nash tariﬀs in (4) are obtained by solving the following ﬁrst-order condition for τ
Wτ =0:( 1+p
w
τ )[τMp +( λ − 1)S] − p
w
τ M =0
In (4) 1/ε ≡ M∗
pwM∗













cMp +( λ − 1)S]=0
The Nash tariﬀ for each small country in (29) is obtained by solving the following ﬁrst-order
condition for τ∗κ, where all variables correspond to their import good, y.
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where in the second line we use the property that the demand and supply for each κ are
identical to the original value divided by κ s.t. zκ = z/κ for z = S∗,M∗,M∗
p.W e t h e n
implicitly diﬀerentiate the market clearing condition for y to obtain pw
τ∗κ
M(p


















ppw/M ∗,w eh a v e( 2 9 ) .
266.2 Additional Proofs
Proposition 3
(a) Since the large country has κ identical ICs, assume that if it deviates in one of them,
it deviates in all. The payoﬀsa r ed e ﬁned as in section 3.1 but now the foreign tariﬀsa r e























For each of the small countries W∗κ = W∗/κ so we can multiply both sides of their IC






















We prove τcκ >τ ∗cκ ≥ τg by contradiction. Assume that the lowest self-enforcing cooper-
ative tariﬀ is τcκ = τ∗cκ ≥ τg and that it is such that the IC in (39) binds. We then show
that when τcκ = τ∗cκ t h eI Ci n( 3 8 )i sv i o l a t e d .S i n c et h eR H So f( 3 8 )a n d( 3 9 )a r ee q u a l


























which is the same as
Wx(τ = τ






27w h e r ew eu s et h es y m m e t r y ,W∗
x = Wy,W∗
y = Wx. The inequality in (40) always holds
because
(i) Wx(τN) − Wx(τ∗Nκ) > 0 since τN is the optimal value for Wx
(ii) Wy(τ∗ = τN) − Wy(τ∗ = τ∗Nκ) < 0 since τN = τ∗N >τ ∗Nκ and dWy(τN)/dτ∗ < 0
(recall that y is the export for home)
If τcκ alone is increased then eventually (38) would hold. However, an increase in τcκ
alone causes (39) to be violated since it reduces the gains from cooperation (the RHS of
(39)) by a greater amount than the gains from deviation (the LHS). Thus both tariﬀsm u s t
be raised but τcκ more so than τ∗cκ. To see why, suppose both tariﬀsw e r ei n c r e a s e db y
the same amount up to a point where (38) binds. Then, once again, we would have a
situation where, at identical tariﬀs, the LHS of (38) exceeds that of (39). The diﬀerence is
that now since (38) just binds and because at a symmetric tariﬀ the RHS of both IC are
identical, there must be slack in (39). This implies that a τ∗cκ <τ cκ is self-enforcing since
the reduction in τ∗cκ reduces the slack in (39) without violating (38). A related argument
can be constructed even if (38) does not bind in a symmetric equilibrium: starting from
the same point, equal increases in the two tariﬀs( i . e .τ∗cκ and τcκ) have similar marginal
eﬀects on the gains from deviation and cooperation in (38) and (39) but since we require
a larger increase in slack in (38), the increase in τcκ needs to be larger.
(b) If the large country posts a bond bκ and each of the small countries post a bond b∗κ
with a third party, as described in section 3.4, they can enforce τg, the global optimum.
To determine the minimum values of these bonds we need to solve the respective IC when
































First, WD(τN,τ∗cκ = τg) − WC(τg)=Wx(τN) − Wx(τg). Similarly, W∗D(τ∗Nκ,τg) −
W∗C(τg)=W∗
y(τ∗Nκ) − W∗
y(τg)=Wx(τ = τ∗Nκ) − Wx(τg),w h e r et h el a s te q u a l i t yi sd u e
to symmetry. Therefore bκ−κb∗κ = Wx(τN)−Wx(τ = τ∗Nκ), which is positive because τN
maximizes Wx and τ∗Nκ <τ N.¤
Proposition 4:
(a) V ∗f >V∗τ.T h e s ep a y o ﬀsa r ed e ﬁned in (34) and (33). Using these and simplifying





















































where the second line uses the deﬁnition of the punishment and cooperative payoﬀs, the
third the deﬁnition of fmax in (19) and the symmetry assumption across countries. The
fourth line uses the deﬁnition of deviation and cooperative payoﬀs. The ﬁfth line uses the
deﬁnition of δ
nmax
in (13) and simpliﬁes. The sixth uses the deﬁnitions of the payoﬀs. The
last line is necessarily true because Nash tariﬀsa r ei n e ﬃcient and each country’s payoﬀ
29under own and foreign Nash tariﬀsi sl o w e rt h a ni t sc o o p e r a t i v ep a y o ﬀ.
(b) Our deﬁnition of Pareto improvement in the text is satisﬁed if (i) WC(τcf)=
WC(τcτ); (ii) W∗C(τcf)=W∗C(τcτ); (iii) V f = V τ;a n d( i v )V ∗f >V ∗τ.S i n c e t h e l a s t
inequality is shown in part (a) we need only show the ﬁrst three equalities. From proposition
1w ek n o wt h a tτcf = τcτ. Therefore WC(τcf)=WC(τcτ). Given symmetry we also have
W∗C(τcf)=W∗C(τcτ). As we show in section 3.1, equation (13), V τ = V τ min = δ
1−δWN.
In section 3.2, equation (18) shows that V f is also equal to that value. Thus, under the
most cooperative tariﬀ we have V τ = V f.¤
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